We investigate how bank migration across state lines over the last quarter century has affected the size and covariance of business fluctuations within states. Starting with a two-state version of the unit banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we conclude that the theoretical effect of integration on business cycle size is ambiguous, as some shocks are dampened by integration, but others are amplified. Empirically, we find that integration diminishes employment growth fluctuations within states, and decreases the deviations in employment growth across states. Business cycles within states become smaller with integration, in other words, but more alike. Our results for the United States bear on the financial convergence underway in Europe, where banks remain highly fragmented across nations.
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Introduction
Banking in the United States was once highly disunited. Instead of a few, very large banks branched out across the states, we had essentially 50 separate banking systems, one for every state. Integration began in the late 1970s, as states began opening their doors to out-of-state banks. Big bank holding companies marched in, forming even bigger companies by merging and buying up other holding companies and unit banks. This integration has not only produced larger (but fewer) U.S. banks, as many have noted, it has also transformed our fragmented banking industry of twenty-five years ago into a much more nationally integrated, geographically diversified system (Map).
What of it? Why should bank integration warrant attention here? Under segregated banking, the fate of the state and its banks were closely tied; as went the states, so went the banks. Farm price deflation in the early 1980s bankrupted many farmers and many farm banks, just as falling oil prices in the late 80s wiped out a lot of Texans and Texas banks. Falling prices may have precipitated these events, but the associated financial distress-the deterioration in bank capital and borrower collateral in particular--may have amplified the ultimate impact of the shocks, or so a large literature maintains (Bernanke, Gertler et al) .
This paper investigates how the integration of our banking system has altered state business cycle dynamics, both within and across states. To investigate the theoretical effects, we add a second (physical) state to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) unitbanking model. By stylizing results from other models, they manage to incorporate the firm collateral and bank capital shocks considered in isolation in other models. Both 2 shocks are contractionary with unit banking, not surprisingly, but the impact is transmitted not just through falling investment demand but also via contracting bank credit supply. When we add the second state, we find that interstate banking dampens the own-state effect of bank capital but amplifies the impact of firm collateral shocks. As a theoretical matter, we conclude that bank integration has an ambiguous affect on state business volatility.
Our empirical findings suggest that the net effect of integration on state business volatility is stabilizing.
1 State and year specific fluctuations in employment growth diminish significantly as banks within the state commingle with out-of-state banks (via holding companies). The results are even stronger when we control for the composition of employment within states, and when we instrument for integration using dummy variables indicating the year each state entered an interstate banking agreement with one or more other states. Differences in growth across states tend to diminish with integration, suggesting increased covariance of state business cycles. We conclude that state business cycles become smaller with integration, but more alike.
Our findings for the United States, where integration is far along, should be glad tidings for Europe, where international bank integration is just commencing. Judging from their liability mix (Chart 1), European nation banks are still highly fragmented.
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Applied there, our findings suggest that further bank integration in Europe will lead to smaller, but more correlated, national business cycles. More generally, our results may 1 Conceptually, there is more likely one shock that gets distributed to various parties by preexisting contractual structure, bankruptcy arrangements, etc. 2 Except, of course, for the banking centers of Switzerland and the U.K. and the three "Benelux" nations.
Garcia Blandon (2001) finds that foreign bank entry in Europe is impeded by various non-regulatory barriers, such as cultural distance between consumers, while export levels and the presence of multinationals are positively correlated with foreign bank penetration.
3 inform thinking about worldwide financial integration, since "globalization" is just a scaled-up version of the natural integration studied here.
II. Integration and Volatility: Some Literature
Capital and banking market integration have been considered in a variety of contexts. The international literature on capital market integration (across nations)
focuses mostly on the risk-sharing benefits of integration; cross-country diversification of asset portfolios tends to smooth aggregate consumption within nations. We doubt that banking integration in the U.S. has important risk-sharing effects since capital (i.e., stock)
markets have been well-integrated across U.S. states for decades. In fact, Asdrubali et al.
(1996) find that U.S. capital markets play a more vital role in income and consumption smoothing across states than do credit markets. The international literature does find, however, that increased capital market integration may actually amplify the own-country effect of productivity shocks as capital is able to flee a country afflicted with a productivity slump. Our model of interstate banking has some of that flavor. compares the unit banking system in the U.S. to the more integrated system in Canada. Using an equilibrium costly monitoring model, he argues that the cross-province banking in Canada should have stabilized the banking system there relative to the unit banking system in the U.S. His model also implies, somewhat counter-intuitively, that integration amplifies the aggregate impact of aggregate real shocks. Integrated banking systems are less volatile, in other words, but the economy as a whole becomes more volatile. 3 Our paper, by contrast, investigates how banking 3 The counterintuitive result that integration amplifies the effect of real shocks seems to stem from the type of shock considered (a mean preserving increase in the projected technology risk) and on a hard-toexplain effect of bank diversification on the elasticity of credit demanded by firms. His evidence from the pre-War period is mixed.
integration affects state volatility (rather than bank or aggregate volatility). Our model (below) is also quite different from his.
III. An Interstate Banking Model
We add a state to the (unit) banking model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and explain how interstate banking alters the impact of various shocks. As it turns out, interstate banking is not necessarily stabilizing since some types of shocks get dampened, but other types get amplified.
The Holmstrom and Tirole Model
The HT model comprises three players: firms, financial intermediaries, and investors.
All are risk neutral. Firms have access to identical project technologies, but they differ in their initial capital endowments: 0 A . Financial intermediaries ("banks") and investors can both lend to firms, but only the banks have monitoring know-how; the uninformed investors must rely on monitoring by the banks. Investors have access to an alternative investment opportunity.
Technology. Firms choose between a good project and either of two bad projects.
The "good" project succeeds with probability H p ; both "bad" projects succeed with probability L p . A key parameter in the model is the good and bad projects' relative likelihood of success:
. All of the projects return R per-unit invested if they are successful and 0 if not. R is public. The two bad projects also produce differing amounts of private benefits (to the firm): type b bad projects produce a small private benefit (b); type B bad projects produce a larger private benefit (B > b ).
Moral Hazard and Monitoring. Moral hazard arises because of the private benefits from bad investments; firms may choose bad projects over good projects (with 5 higher expected returns) because the former produce private (i.e., unshared) benefits.
Monitoring by a bank can prevent type B investment, but not type b investment. The idea here is that monitoring is an effective deterrent against obvious fraud and abuse (e.g., simply absconding with the borrowed funds), but smaller abuses, (shirking, etc.) must be remedied through incentive schemes. Monitoring costs are proportional to the amount invested; if investment is I, monitoring costs = cI. Monitoring is itself a private activity, in that savers cannot determine if bankers have actually monitored a given firm.
Private monitoring creates a second moral hazard; unless it is worthwhile, bankers will only pretend to monitor. Banks' must invest enough of their own capital in the project to ensure that they will monitor adequately. Contracts. Firms will always choose a mix of liabilities, borrowing from both the bank and investors. If the project succeeds, the firm, bank monitor, and uninformed investors receive Rf, Rm and Ru percent of the return. These shares are determined endogenously, of course, by the opportunity costs of the three parties. We prefer the intermediation interpretation of financing structure offered by HT: investors deposit their money with the bank; banks fund the firms they monitor with those deposits and the bank's own capital. The bank's ability to attract deposits depends on its own capital (which is needed to assure uninformed investors that it will monitor firms adequately). 
The main budget constraint (1) limits the sum of returns to the three parties to the total return on the investment. 6 Eq. (2) is an incentive constraint; the gain in expected payments to the firm from choosing the good project cannot be less than the private benefit from choosing the first bad project. Eq. (3) is an incentive constraint on the intermediary; the expected gain in return to the bank from forcing the firm to choose the good project must exceed the cost of monitoring, else the bank will not monitor. In equilibrium, all constraints will bind.
After solving the model, Holmstrom and Tirole show how shocks to each players' capital affect the equilibrium returns to investors (γ ) and banks ( β ) and the rate of investment by firms. With just one state, a reduction in savings supply (a savings "squeeze") increases γ and decreases β . Intuitively, the changes in equilibrium returns reflect the changes in the relative scarcity of the different forms of capital. A decrease in informed capital (a capital "crunch") decreases γ and increases β . A fall in firms' 7 capital (a collateral "squeeze") decreases γ and decreases β . All three shocks have a contractionary effect on firms' investment spending.
Interstate Banking in the HT Model
We extend the HT model to interstate banking by simply adding another physical state. The only subtlety is in the treatment of capital mobility across states under the two banking regimes (unit and interstate) that we want to compare. For simplicity, we make the extreme assumption that capital is completely immobile across states under unit banking. In other words, unit banking is equivalent to the single state world HT considered. At the opposite extreme, we assume that capital is completely mobile across states under interstate banking. These extreme assumptions are not necessary for our results below, however; we obtain qualitatively similar results so long as capital is relatively less mobile under unit banking.
The appendix contains details on the extended model, the equilibrium, and the comparative statics. Table 1 Intuitively, the increase in γ necessary to compensate for the savings squeeze in state 1 is smaller under interstate banking because uninformed capital can be attracted from state 2.
By mitigating the increase in γ , cross-state capital flows reduce the impact of the shock on creditworthy demand for uninformed capital.
Proposition 2: with interstate banking, the negative impact of an informed capital crunch in state 1 on the amount of uninformed capital invested in that state is smaller than with unit banking. The intuition for this result (see Table 2 ) is that with interstate banking, the increase in β necessary to compensate the informed capital crunch in state 1 is smaller than with unit banking, since informed capital can be attracted from state 2.
This mitigates the increase in β and its negative impact on the demand for uninformed capital in state 1.
Proposition 3: with interstate banking, a collateral squeeze in state 1 has a positive impact on the amount of uninformed capital invested in state 2. Hence, the amounts of uninformed capital invested in the two states move in opposite directions following a state specific collateral shock. The intuition for this result is that with interstate banking, the drop in the creditworthy demand for uninformed capital implied by the collateral squeeze in state 1 leads to a flight of uninformed and informed capital to state 2, which decreases β and γ in that state. As a result, the creditworthy demand for uninformed capital in state 2 increases.
In sum, cross-state banking amplifies the effects of local shocks to entrepreneurial wealth (or, equivalently, productivity shocks) because capital chases the highest return.
Capital flows into the state when collateral (productivity) is high and out when it is low, making the highs higher and the lows lower. Integration dampens the impact of bank 9 capital and savings supply. These sources of instability become less important because entrepreneurs are less dependent on local sources of funding (banks and consumers) in an integrated market since funds or bank capital can be imported from other states.
IV. Empirical Strategy and Data
Identifying the separate shocks just discussed seems like an impossible task.
Even with the requisite data, the high correlation between bank capital and borrower collateral would require incredible identifying assumptions. Instead, we ask a more tractable (but still useful) question: how has banking integration across states affected overall volatility within states? Do state-specific business fluctuations get bigger or smaller as banks in that state become increasingly integrated with banks in other states?
We know from the model that if capital and savings shocks are a larger source of volatility than collateral shocks, the net effect of integration should be stabilizing.
Integration, in other words, should reduce volatility.
Endogenous Integration?
Reverse causality of two sorts concerns us. First, increased cross-state banking may indicate merely that states' economies are becoming more integrated; banks may simply follow their customers across state lines. If so, and if "real" integration affects business volatility, our results may confuse the effects of state integration and bank integration. Reverse causality could arise also via banking "hangovers" (from too much farming, or too much oil) as the associated distress and volatility may attract bargainhunting banks from other states. To guard against these or other potential endogeneity problems, we instrument for integration using an indicator for the year a state entered an interstate banking agreement and the number of years elapsed since the agreement.
A Brief History of Interstate Banking
Restrictions on interstate banking in the U. This roughly 15-year history provides an excellent experiment to see how the resulting integration has affected volatility. Luckily for us, the states did not deregulate all at once, and the subsequent integration across states proceeded at different rates (Chart 2). These staggered deregulatory events provide us with both cross-sectional and time 7 As part of the Garn-St Germain Act, federal legislators amended in 1982 the Bank Holding Company Act to allow failed banks and thrifts to be acquired by any bank holding company, regardless of state laws (see, e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 1996) .
series variation with which to identify the effects of integration; also, the deregulatory events themselves provide a good instrument for integration.
Measuring Integration and Volatility
Bank integration equals the share of total state bank assets in a state that are owned by banks affiliated with an out-of-state bank holding company. To illustrate, if a state had one unit bank and one affiliated bank of equal size, integration in that state would equal ½. We associate volatility with the year-to-year deviations (from average) in various measures of business activity. Starting with the annual growth rate of series x for state i in year t, we first subtract off the mean growth rate in x for state i over time.
"Demeaning" by the state average accounts for long-run growth differences across states.
We then subtract off the mean growth rate of series x across states in year t. Demeaning by the national average each year helps control for aggregate business fluctuations. Our volatility measures will be the square of the resulting deviations, or the log of the squared deviations.
The three series we demean in this way are the annual growth rates of total state employment, small firm employment (N < 20), and commercial loans at banks. in other words, at the beginning of the end of the fragmented era of the banking system.
While loan volatility seems like the natural place to look for evidence that integration matters, the noisy and short series available to us will make the effects difficult to detect.
The integration and volatility measures are summarized in Table 2 . The mean share of integrated bank assets over the full sample of state-years was 0.35. Overall employment grew 2 percent per year on average over the sample of state-years.
Employment growth volatility, as just defined, averaged 0.04%. Small firm employment growth was more than an order of magnitude less volatile than overall employment growth, but of course, the sample periods are not the same. Business loans grew over 7 percent per year on average (nominally), with average volatility of 1.6%.
VI. Results
In view of the ambiguous theoretical relationship between integration and volatility, we choose to report a variety of relationships between the two variables. For each of the three measures of business volatility, we report both OLS and instrumental variable estimates. IV seemed advisable since the pace of integration may itself depend employees. We drop Delaware and South Dakota as these two states' banking sectors are dominated by credit card banks due to their liberal usury laws. See Jayaratne and Strahan, 1999 for details.
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on volatility. As our instrument, we use a dummy variable equal to zero before a state allowed interstate banking agreement, and one after. We report results using the squared deviation in each of the three business measures as a dependent variable (volatility), and the log of the squared deviations (log volatility). Logging seemed advisable to ensure our results were not driven by outliers. Since the employment volatility will obviously depend on labor force compositions, we also control for the share of employment in each one digit SIC sector (manufacturing, services, etc.) and employment concentration (the sum of the squared shares). We report results with and without the employment controls.
In all specifications we control for the year and state, so the resulting fixed effect estimates reveal how increased integration within a state in a given year is related to volatility within the same state and year.
11 Table 3 reports the estimated coefficient estimates on the banking integration variable for various specifications. All but one of the estimates are negative, suggesting that integration has, on net, a stabilizing influence on state business volatility. The coefficient is statistically significant in many cases, most especially for total employment volatility (Panel A). The IV coefficient estimates are considerably larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, implying that the stabilizing influence of integration is larger (if less precisely estimated) when we use the deregulation dummy variables to parcel out the endogenous variation in integration. Controlling for state's labor force 11 But other important changes occurred during the 1980s, such as rapid adoption of sophisticated financial models and increased use of securitization, not just for residential mortgages but also for consumer loans, commercial real estate loans and even commercial and industrial loans (Mishkin and Strahan, 1999) . These new technologies seem to have increased the efficient scale in banking and may be responsible, in part, for greater integration. For an exhaustive review of the causes and consequences of financial consolidation in the U.S., see Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) .
composition also tends to increase the size and significance of the integration coefficient, at least for the two employment volatility measures (Panels A and B).
The IV estimates (with employment controls) imply a substantial stabilizing benefit from integrating bank assets across states. The share of integrated bank assets rose from 10 percent in 1975 to 60 percent in 1996, implying a reduction in state employment growth volatility of .2 percent, a large number compared to mean employment volatility over the sample (.04 percent)
The significance levels trail off as we move to narrower business activity measures. For business loans, the insignificance may be due to the short, noisy series we have available. Integration and volatility of small firm employment growth are significant for half of the estimates. The weaker results here are harder to explain, as the data are better and we have more of it. Integration is associated with convergence in state business cycles toward the national average (Table 4) 12 The sum goes to 49 because DE and SD are excluded (due of credit card banks) while DC is included. 13 Deviations from average growth were larger, for example, for states with larger than average construction sectors, while those with large financial sectors were closer to average.
Integration and Convergence
If integration dampens idiosyncratic fluctuations in growth within
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Perhaps we are asking too much of the data when we split it so finely. We have found,
for example, that when we split the data at firms with more than 100 or more workers, integration has no effect (to be added). Broadly speaking, then, integration seems to promote convergence only among smaller firms.
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. used to have essentially 50 banking systems, one in every state. With deregulation over the last twenty-five years, we have moved toward a more integrated, national banking system with holding companies operating banks in many different states. As a theoretical matter, the impact of cross-state banking on business volatility is ambiguous, as integration immunizes borrowers from shocks to their own banks but exposes them to shocks in other states. Empirically, integration seems stabilizing on net;
employment growth fluctuations in a state diminish as its banks commingle with other states' banks. The results are less significant with narrower measures, but the signs are the same, suggesting that the fragmented U.S. banking system before the mid-1980s was, in all likelihood, a source of state business volatility. Integration also promotes convergence across states; deviations in employment growth from the national average tend to fall as integration increases. State business cycles are becoming smaller, in other words, but more alike. As the French say: the more things change, the more they stay the same.
Appendix: Interstate Banking in the HT Model Equilibrium
The optimal investment (I) and liability mix are determined by 
The equilibrium rates of return in the two capital markets are
where
is the total amount of capital invested.
Now suppose there are two states. Under unit banking (i.e., before interstate banking was allowed), and assuming capital cannot move across states, the above equilibrium holds in each state. Interstate banking changes the equilibrium in two ways.
Assuming capital can move freely across states to equalize the return to uninformed savers in the two states, there will be a single, aggregate (statewide) inverse supply of uninformed capital Assuming complete capital immobility under unit banking and completely mobile capital under interstate banking is extreme, of course. All we really need for the results below is that capital is more mobile under interstate banking than under unit banking, which seems innocuous.
Equilibrium in the uninformed capital market under interstate banking requires
The equilibrium rates of return are:
Proof of proposition 1:
In the unit banking case, the derivative of
is positive, since the positiveness of the payment promised to uninformed
In the interstate banking case, the derivative of 
For the interstate banking case, the derivative of 
Proof of proposition 3:
For the unit banking case, the derivative of 
is positive.
14 Since we assume symmetry between the two states, . This provides a direct and convenient way for computing the difference between the two derivatives. 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 0 .
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Interstate banking agreements occurred in waves between 1982 and 1993. States were grouped by the year that they entered into an agreement. Plotted for each wave is the median share of out-of-state banking assets for states in each wave. 1982-1984 wave ∆: 1985-1987 wave : : 1988-1990 wave : 1991-1993 wave 
